NYT dam theory ignores history and politics of water in Iran

Jamshid Jamshidi – Responsible Statecraft:
On 16 November, the New York Times ran an investigation by Sanam Mahoozi and Erika Solomon that opens with a researcher’s hunch.
Nima Shokri, who works on water security at the Hamburg University of Technology, had been counting Iranian dams for years, and his team’s tally had reached at least 533, some in areas for which there was no apparent need for the water.
Last spring, he came across a map of U.S. and Israeli air strikes on suspected missile sites, a semicircle of dots running from north to south, and thought it looked very like his own.
While the Times cautiously noted that any connection between the dams and Iran’s missile program “remains speculative,” the two reporters interviewed seven water and military experts who, according to their account, “have concluded that the water projects may have been developed to support the country’s military buildup.” Building secret underground complexes near a dam’s reservoir and power made sense, according to these sources. Danny Citrinowicz, who spent years as an Iran analyst in Israeli military intelligence, said it would give Tehran “operational continuity.”
In Iran, geography and local politics help explain why dams are built. Both must be considered before attributing their construction to military needs. The report doesn’t even try to do so.
Mountains, rivers and qanats
Outside the Caspian strip, most of Iran’s rain and snow falls on the Zagros and the Alborz mountain ranges. The Zagros feeds the Karun, the Karkheh and the Dez, Iran’s largest rivers, and dams are built where those rivers emerge from narrow gorges. Missile bases are dug into the same mountains because solid rock offers protection. Dams and underground missile bases may therefore be located in the same mountainous areas for entirely different reasons.
But their proximity alone does not establish a military connection. To determine whether the pattern is unusual, their locations must be compared with other places with similar geography.
How much of the overlap this accounts for is a question for data rather than for maps.
Statistician Omid Solari used publicly available data to examine whether suspected missile sites were unusually close to dams after accounting for geography. His analysis found that the sites appeared closer to dams than randomly selected locations across Iran, according to one measure. But when compared with places that had similar terrain and proximity to rivers and towns, the difference disappeared. His analysis has not been peer-reviewed and uses different, incomplete data, so it cannot establish whether the pattern identified by the Times is explained by geography alone.
The need to move water is far older than any dam. Iran gets little rain, and, across most of the country, farmers, unable to count on sufficient rainfall, depend on irrigation.
In the summer of 2020, the energy minister said Iran was among the five countries with the largest irrigated area in the world. A 2021 analysis of the Karkheh crisis in the reformist Etemad newspaper pointed to the thousands of miles of qanat channels, and to land abandoned due to drought, as the reason that people in Iran have historically fought over water more than over land.
Qanats, of which an estimated 37,000 are still working, tap an aquifer at the head of a valley and carry the water downhill through tunnels to fields and villages, sometimes over many miles. There are more modern irrigation methods, but those are expensive undertakings, and each must be justified on its merits. But the desire to transport water from where its source to where people live is not suspicious in itself.
According to data compiled by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), agriculture accounts for about 92% of Iran’s freshwater withdrawals. Electricity is a smaller part of the picture than the Times’ military hypothesis implies. Hydropower constitutes something on the order of 14% of Iran’s generating capacity but usually accounts for only about 4 to 6% of the power actually produced, rising in years of plentiful rainfall and falling in years of drought.
Thus, a dam-constructed reservoir is above all an irrigation and water-supply project. While that does not necessarily establish the purpose of any single dam, it does mean that assuming that Iran’s dams serve mainly as power stations starts with their least important purpose.
Who asks for a dam?
In 1979, Iran had 19 reservoir dams. The energy minister counted 144 in 2020. Most of that growth came after the Iran-Iraq war, when progress toward reconstruction and economic development was measured by large, visible infrastructure projects. The engineering arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Khatam al-Anbiya, became one of the biggest dam contractors. That establishes a real connection between the IRGC and dams, although, based on publicly available information, the link is commercial, not military.
A great deal of what initiates and sustains a development project in Iran is local. Parliamentary seats are based on counties; most constituencies elect a single member, and political parties are weak. Much like members of Congress in the United States, Iranian deputies are judged by what they bring home to their constituencies. Provinces compete for shares of the same development budget, and once a dam has been promised, it gains defenders in parliament and officials in the provincial government who keep pressing ministries for money, even when its economic or environmental value is questionable.
Take the Dalaki dam in Bushehr as an example. In 2020, Ebrahim Rezaei, who represents Dashtestan, raised its financing with the energy minister in parliament and demanded that the head of Khatam al-Anbiya, the dam’s contractor, not halt work on the project for lack of funds. By late 2023, he was listing the dam’s progress among his achievements, along with 65 billion tomans he had secured for it from the oil sector. In October 2024, he said he had sent President Masoud Pezeshkian a letter for assurances of its continued funding.
None of this explains why the dam was approved in the first place. It does show how a project gains political support and makes it difficult, once initiated, to cancel.
Pressure can also delay a project. Beheshtabad, a plan to carry water from the Karun headwaters to the cities of Isfahan, Yazd and Kerman, was at one point endorsed by the Supreme Water Council but has stalled repeatedly since. Environmental permits and legal complaints are part of that story, and so is the years-long opposition to it by deputies from the provinces from which the water would be diverted.
Another example is one of Iran’s driest provinces, Yazd, which has relied for centuries on qanats to transport water from mountains tens of miles away. The first major pipeline from the Zayandeh Rud river was agreed upon in the late 1980s, built during the 1990s and opened in 2000 under President Mohammad Khatami, himself from Yazd.
Its planning began years before Iran’s first tests of longer-range ballistic missiles. The project followed years of bargaining among provincial officials and the central government over the city’s water supply. The Times quotes Amir AghaKouchak, who suggested that a transfer from the Zagros mountains to Yazd “may have been influenced, at least in part, by military considerations.” Unfortunately, however, the report failed to identify precisely which scheme he was referring to, so its planning history and political sponsors cannot be examined.
The politics of water infrastructure in Iran is closely tied to the politics of who gets the water. The Karkheh basin offers a clear example. Its rivers flow through six provinces, forming a single water system, but the communities that depend on them are represented by different provincial authorities and members of parliament. The dam is located in Andimeshk, in Khuzestan, while the agricultural areas it serves extend into other constituencies and even neighboring Ilam, where a 50,000-hectare irrigation scheme depends on water transported from the same reservoir.
The competing demands became particularly visible during the severe water shortages of July 2021. As protests spread across Khuzestan, water releases from the Karkheh dam increased from about 75 to 160 cubic metres per second. The provincial water authority reported that more than 70% of the reservoir’s usable storage had been released. Provincial and parliamentary officials publicly announced the increased flows to downstream areas in Khuzestan.
Meanwhile, the irrigation scheme in Ilam received no water allocation from that reservoir that summer. The basin authority later identified excessive releases and the expansion of water-intensive rice cultivation as serious management problems.
The episode illustrates a broader problem in Iran’s water politics. Although the river is shared, the communities depending on it pursue their interests through separate provincial governments and parliamentary representatives. Decisions affecting the entire basin are therefore shaped by political pressures that arise within individual territories, while the consequences extend beyond their boundaries.
These same local demands also influence which dams, canals and water-transfer projects receive political support and public funding. Understanding this competition helps explain the development of Iran’s water infrastructure in ways that geography or military considerations alone cannot.
Why a dam was planned, how it was paid for, and what it is used for now are all distinct questions. Dates help in answering the first. The Dez dam project, for example, began in 1956 and the dam was completed in 1963. The Karkheh basin was surveyed for irrigation beginning in 1956. A reservoir was proposed in 1980, and the site near Andimeshk was chosen, according to the project history, for its geology. Building began in 1992.
Iran first disclosed the existence of an underground missile base on television in 2015. When the bases were actually dug is much harder to pin down. But a dam built decades before the construction of a base is very unlikely to have been conceived as a military or missile base, although it could still have been used or altered for such a purpose later.
What would really decide the matter is the paperwork: commissioning documents, budget records, any technical evidence of a dedicated supply line. The best case for the military reading would be a dam that no deputy ever fought for and that irrigates no one’s fields. If such a dam exists, the Times map does not show it.
There is a legal reason for caution as well. International humanitarian law gives dams special, conditional protection because of the dangerous forces they contain and the potential devastation that could result if they are attacked. That protection does not automatically disappear because a military site is located nearby. It is possible that military facilities were deliberately placed near existing dams to take advantage of that protection. But even so, this would not establish that the dams themselves were originally built for military purposes.
Iran’s water policy has caused real environmental damage and allocated a vital resource in unfair ways. But the assertion that these civilian facilities were built for war requires evidence of their original purpose, beyond where they happen to be located. It cannot rest on speculation.




